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IT Investment Types and Shareholder Investment Horizons 
 
1. Introduction 
A significant body of work has examined the organizational performance impacts of 
information technology (IT) investments (for reviews of this literature, see Brynjolfsson & Yang, 
2004; Dedrick et al. 2003; Melville et al. 2004).  Using myriad approaches to empirically study 
this relationship, researchers have examined both the magnitude of the impact as well as the 
mechanisms by which value from IT is derived.    Market based measures have been particularly 
useful to understand how a firm’s shareholders react and respond to overall IT investments.   
Although these studies have confirmed the value relevance of IT investments to shareholders 
they are all based on analyses of the total financial market returns to the overall levels of IT 
investments.  To the best of our knowledge, none have taken into account two critical factors that 
potentially impact how shareholders value IT investments. First, IT investments are not 
monolithic and can differ greatly in objectives, scope and timing of benefits. Second, the investor 
community is not homogeneous and can differ in their preference for different types of IT 
investments based on the goals, risks, and investment time horizon of these investments. In this 
paper, we close these two critical gaps in the IT and business value literature, by examining the 
financial impact of a firm’s short and long term IT investments from a contingency perspective 
that focuses on the heterogeneity of a firm’s investor community.   
A key decision that firms make with their IT investment budget is the portfolio decision, 
or the proportion of the IT budget spent on achieving goals related to operational efficiency such 
as maintaining or integrating existing applications, versus the proportion of the IT budget spent 
on new IT development projects (Gregory et. al. 2015).  A common and practical manifestation 
of this tradeoff occurs when firms choose to continue spending on maintaining and improving 
current IT systems rather than innovating with   new IT projects. Industry analysts agree that the 
majority share of IT budgets go toward managing existing systems rather than developing new 
IT capabilities.  If indeed firms are underinvesting in IT targeted toward building strategic 
capabilities in favor of maintenance and integration spending that emphasizes operational 
advantages, it is worthwhile to examine how the shareholders respond to this behavior.  While 
the value relevance of IT investments to shareholders has been established in the main, the 
question of whether the investor community is able to differentiate the value potential of these 
two fundamentally different types of IT investments remains unexplored.     
To explore this question, we call for a focus on a firm’s investor base and contend that 
the market reaction to IT investments is a function of the nature of the investor base of the firm.   
Specifically, we examine if the market returns to IT investments are moderated by the investor 
time horizon, such that investors with shorter time horizons are more likely to reward firms that 
choose to invest their IT dollars on short-term (operational) projects rather than on long-term 
(strategic) projects.     
 2. Theory 
2.1 Operational versus Strategic IT Investments 
  Over the last two decades, numerous studies have documented the substantial effect of IT 
investment on various firm-level performance measures.  However, by using the total annual IT 
budget (or IT spend in $) as a proxy for overall IT investments,  these studies have made the 
critical assumption that all the IT related expenditures go toward creating new long term IT 
capabilities.   According to a recent survey published in Zdnet, American companies spend on 
average about two-thirds (67%) of their annual IT budget on maintenance and mandatory 
spending such as on projects designed to maintain existing service levels and for complying with 
regulatory or legal systems.  Only the remaining one-third of the total budget is allocated for 
projects aimed at innovation and new business opportunities1.  
 Clearly these two categories of IT spending are distinct not only with respect to their 
underlying objectives, but also in regards to their corresponding risks and payoffs.   The strategic 
grid framework (Nolan and McFarlan 2005) recognizes this dichotomy and classifies firms based 
on the nature of their IT spending as having either a defensive or an offensive posture. Defensive 
IT is about operational reliability and the bulk of the firm’s IT spending goes toward keeping 
existing systems up and running.  On the other hand, firms with an offensive posture tend to be 
more ambitious and adventurous with their technology investments as they try to leverage IT for 
strategic purposes and to rise to a position of industry leadership.  
                                                          
1 http://www.zdnet.com/article/heres-what-your-tech-budget-is-being-spent-on/ 
2.2. Institutional Investors and investment time horizons  
 Financial institutions (defined under SEC rule 13-F) such as banks, insurance companies, 
mutual and pension funds that exercise investment discretion (i.e., buy or sell securities) over 
$100 million or more on behalf of their principals are categorized as institutional investors.  In 
contrast to individual investors, institutional investors are more sophisticated and utilize a variety 
of valuation strategies (Bushee 1998; 2001). They also tend to differ in their investment time 
horizons due to the heterogeneity in the maturity dates of their liabilities.  Institutional investors 
with a longer-term investment horizon generally tend to invest in fewer firms but have 
significant holdings in each of them. They trade infrequently and follow a buy and hold strategy, 
while placing a great deal of importance in future cash flows and longer-term dividend income or 
capital appreciation (Bushee 2001).   In contrast, shorter-term investors have smaller holdings 
but in many firms and because these are often subject to large short-term redemptions by their 
fiduciary clients, these investors tend to have shorter-term investment horizon. They focus on 
performance measures such as current earnings which are easily quantifiable, and tend to 
underweight the long-term earnings component.    
  The preceding discussion suggests the possibility of an interaction effect of IT investment 
types and institutional investor horizons.  Short term IT investments, as noted earlier, are meant 
to scaffold or incrementally improve existing systems and are designed to maintain current 
operations in the most cost effective manner, potentially achieving greater cost savings from year 
to year. Such investments seldom represent ambitious goals for turnaround or transformation of 
the company and tend to align well with the goals of short term investors. Therefore, we 
hypothesize: 
H1: The interaction effect between the proportion of short-term institutional investor ownership 
of a firm’s stock and the proportion of its IT budget spent on operational IT investments on the 
firm’s market value will be positive.   
  Institutional investors with a long term mindset tend to be more patient investors who are 
willing to buy and hold a stock for longer durations, thereby giving managers the time and 
resources needed to develop and execute long range strategic plans.   Therefore, 
H2: The interaction effect between the proportion of long-term institutional investor ownership 
of a firm’s stock and the proportion of its IT budget spent on strategic IT investments on the 
firm’s market value will be positive.   
 
3. Empirical Analysis & Results 
  We build our dataset based on Information Week survey data (1999-2006), a leading and 
widely circulated IS publication, and on complementary archival data from COMPUSTAT.  The 
detailed information includes data on the IT department and operations, budgets, and projections, 
along with data on major IT initiatives.  Table 1 describes the variables used in this study. Table 
2 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the model variables.  To assess the impact of 
short and long-term IT spending in the condition of increasing ownership by short-term oriented 
institutional investors on Tobin’s q  , we specify the following model: 
Tobin’s qi,t = β0 + β1Tobin’s qi,(t - 1)   + β2Short ITi,t + β3Long ITi,t + β4INVi,t + β5Short ITi,t×INVi,t 
+ β6Long ITi,t×INVi,t + β7ROAi,t + β8SIZEi,t + β9ADVGi,t + β10RNDi,t+ ui + ei,t      
where Tobin’s qi,t-1 = the lagged dependent variable,  
 Short ITi,t = expected short-term IT spending for firm i at time t, 
Lont ITi,t = expected long-term IT spending for firm i at time t, 
INVi,t = institutional ownership (either short or long-term) for firm i at time t, 
ADi,t = advertising spending scaled by sales for firm i at time t,  
RNDi,t = research and development spending scaled by sales for firm i in year t, 
 SIZEi,t = size of firm i at time t, measured as the log of total assets, and  
 ROAi,t = return on assets of firm i at time t. 
 The results shown in Table 3 are found to be robust to concerns of endogeneity.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1, our results show that firms that focus on operational IT projects 
and have an increasing proportional ownership by short-term institutional investors seem to 
benefit (β5 = .3379, p < .01) in terms of increasing financial performance (Tobin’s Q). In 
contrast, when firms engage in building new applications and making investments in more long-
term infrastructure and applications, we observe  a diminishing ( β6 = -.0001, p < .10) 
performance in terms of Tobin’s Q,   thus providing support for H1. When firms have an 
increasing proportion of long-term institutional investors, we observe the opposite results: 
investments in operational IT projects contribute to a lower firm performance, whereas strategic 
IT investment is associated with a higher Tobin’s Q ratio ( β6 = .0001, p < .05), thereby 
supporting H2.   
 4. Conclusion 
Our study contributes to the extant literature on IT and business value but builds on the 
findings in important ways. While the prior literature has examined and confirmed the value 
relevance of IT investments to shareholders,  to the best of our knowledge none of the studies 
have taken into account two critical factors that impact how the financial market values IT 
investments. First, IT investments are not monolithic and can differ greatly in objectives, scope 
and timing of benefits. Second, the investor community is not a homogeneous entity and can 
differ in their preference for different types of IT investments based on the goals, risks, and 
investment time horizon of these investments. In this paper, we close these two critical gaps by 
examining the financial impact of a firm’s short and long term IT investments from a 
contingency perspective that focuses on the moderating role of the firm’s investor base.  In doing 
so, our results indicate the possibility of significantly differential returns to the two types of IT 
expenditures based on the nature of the investor’s  timing horizon.    
  
Table 1 : Variable Descriptions 
Variable Name Description Data Source 
Advertising 
Intensity 
Yearly advertising spending in thousands of USD, 
scaled by total revenue. 
COMPUSTAT 
R&D Intensity Yearly R&D spending in thousands of USD, 
scaled by total revenue. 
COMPUSTAT 
Tobins’ Q  Ratio of the sum of the market value of equity, preferred 
stock, and debt, to the book value of total assets. 
COMPUSTAT 
   
Long IT Long-term oriented IT investments spending (% of 
IT budget spent on new projects/applications). 
InformationWeek  
Short IT Short-term oriented IT investments spending (% of 






Percentage short-term institutional investors’ 
ownership in sample firms.  





Percentage long-term institutional investors’ 
ownership in sample firms. 
B. Bushee’s website / 
COMPUSTAT 
Return on Assets  Return on assets ratio. COMPUSTAT 
Firm Size Total firm assets in thousands of USD, logged. COMPUSTAT 
Table 2: Correlations Table 

















Tobin’s Q 1 1.36   (.98)   1.000          
Market Value    1.21 (1.14) .847*** 1.000         
Short-Term 
Investors  
   29.00 
(7.84) 
-.089** -.084** 1.000        
Long-Term 
Investors 
70.99 (7.84) .108*** .083*** -
1.000*** 
1.000       
Short IT  .02   (.03) .134*** .101*** .063*    -.061** 1.000      
Long IT .01   (.02) .130***    .099*** .015 -. 031 .646*** 1.000     
Advertising 
Intensity 
.01   (.04) .229***  .195*** -.006 .015 .056 .083** 1.000    
R&D Intensity .02   (.04) .251***  .307*** .048 - .028 .039 -.064* -.047 1.000   






-.025 -.080** 1.000  
Return on Assets -.54 (2.76) .049 .076** .016 -.013 .018 .023 .014 .070* -.009 1.000 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 1 Note: Tobin’s q, Short-Term Investors, Short and Long IT, Advertising and R&D intensities, 




Table 3: Long and Short Term IT Investments & Institutional Investor Ownership: Effect on Tobin’s Q, Arellano-Bond 
GMM Models 
  Short-Term Investors Long-Term Investors 
Dependent Variable (t – 1)  .3627*** .3653*** .3334*** .3398*** .3372*** 
Short-Term IT .6742        .6181 -.1905 -1.3400 -2.2907 
Long-Term IT -.0001  -.0001 -.0004 6.2315* 6.0745* 
Investor ownership  -.0345 -.0122 .0085 .0129 
Short Term IT × Investor Ownership   .3379***  -.4198*** 
Long Term IT × Investor Ownership   -.0001*  .0001** 
Controls      
Return on Assets -.0003 -.0053 -.0043 .0001 -.0013 
Firm Size -.1119 -.1111 -.0674 -.0826 -.0661 
Advertising Intensity .6356*** .5221** .5587** .5899** .6226** 
R&D Intensity -1.1384** -1.0678** -1.0340** -.6479* -.6659* 
      
Number of Observations 449 421 421 421 421 
Note: *** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .10. Significance levels of the main effects are based on two-tailed tests, and those of the 
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